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C OMMENTS
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL: The Department,
The Appeals Board, and Judicial Review
By RICHARD W. JOHNSON*
Introducing the Problem
In the state of California the Beverage Department determines whether
or not one shall have the right to sell alcoholic beverages.' The problems
involved in the Department's decisions are typical of those of all adminis-
trative bodies performing quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative functions. The
demands of modern government are such that agencies of this type are
more and more utilized to bridge the gap between the regulatory needs
of the community and the right of the individual to pursue the enterprise
of his choice. The importance of this function thereby becomes evident.
Prior to January 1, 1954, the issuance and control of liquor licenses
was governed by the State Board of Equalization (hereinafter referred to
as the State Board). On that date a state constitutional amendment, section
22, article XX, became operative. It provided for the creation of the
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (hereinafter referred to as the
Department) to assume the powers and duties of the State Board of
Equalization, as well as the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board
(hereinafter referred to as the Appeals Board) to which decisions of the
Department could be appealed. It further provided that the decisions of
the Appeals Board were subject to judicial review.
The state legislature, in conformity therewith, enacted sections of
the Business and Professions Code' implementing the constitutional
amendment.
A hypothetical example will best illustrate the new procedure.
X applies for a license at the local Office of the Department. A Depart-
ment investigator views the premises and submits his recommendation. If
the recommendation is favorable and adopted, the license is issued without
further inquiry.
If the investigator submits an unfavorable report or a protest is filed
by anyone who feels its issuance would be contrary to public welfare and
good morals, X may petition for a license or have a hearing on the protest.
A petition or hearing is before an officer of the Department and X may be
represented by counsel. At this hearing the Department must determine
* Member, Third-Year Class.
'The right to sell intoxicating liquor is not one of the rights growing out of citizenship in
the United States. Wylie v. State Board of Equalization of California, 21 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.
Cal. 1938).
2 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 23000-25762.
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from the evidence if granting the license would be contrary to the good
morals of the community.
If X is denied the license, his only appeal is to the Appeals Board.8 At
this hearing the Appeals Board will review the order of the Department for
abuse of discretion and errors of law, and the Board will decide whether
there is substantial evidence to support the denial.4 Both X and the Depart-
ment may be represented by counsel. If the Appeals Board reverses the
order of the Department, the Director of the Department or any aggrieved
party may have the Appeals Board's order judicially reviewed.5
It is at this point that a problem appears because the constitution does
not spell out the scope of court review of orders of the Appeals Board. The
result has been confusion in the courts. For example, the District Court
of Appeal, Third District,6 interpreted the constitutional amendment to
provide that, in a mandate proceeding, the decision of the Department
should be reviewed; just as the supreme court would review a decision of
the superior court, i.e. to determine if there is substantial evidence to
support the Department's decision.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District,7 reached a contrary
conclusion by interpreting the same amendment to compel court review of
the Appeals Board's decision to determine if it is supported by substantial
evidence.
Both courts agreed that the Department performs a legislative function
in determining whether or not the issuance of a particular license would
be contrary to the public welfare.
It is conceded that the Appeals Board exercises a judicial function in
reviewing decisions of the Department for abuse of discretion, errors of
law, and substantial evidence. The crucial difference of opinion is whether
the Appeals Board shares with the Department its peculiar legislative
function of determining the public policy toward the issuance or continu-
ance of a particular license. The beginning of the answer to this question
is found in the California constitution which grants the Department and
the Appeals Board their power.
Functions of the Beverage Department
The constitution provides that:8
The department of Alcoholic Beverage Control shall have the exclusive
power, except as herein provided and in accordance with the laws enacted
by the Legislature, to license the manufacture, importation and sale of alco-
holic beverages in this State.. . .The department shall have the power, in its
3 CAL. CoNsT. art. XX, § 22; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23091.
4 CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22.
5 CAL. Bus. & PRor. CODE § 23091.
6 329 P.2d 758 (Cal. 1958), vacated sub nom. Martin v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Ap-
peals Board, 52 Cal. 2d ........ 340 P.2d 1 (1959).
7330 P.2d 642 (Cal. 1958), vacated sub norm. Martin v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Ap-
peals Board, 52 Cal. 2d ........ ,341 P.2d 291 (1959).
8 CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22.
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discretion, to deny, suspend or revoke any specific alcoholic beverage license
if it shall determine for good cause that the granting or continuance of such
license would be contrary to public welfare or morals. (Emphasis added.)
The Department's power to issue or revoke a license is then based on
whether the Department determines, for good cause, that the issuance or
continuance of the license is contrary to public welfare or morals.
The Department succeeds to all the powers, duties, purposes, respon-
sibilities and jurisdiction of the State Board.' So cases construing the
State Board's powers are in point.
The State Board had broad discretionary power to control the issuance
or continuance of licenses.10 The extent of this power was passed upon in
Covert v. State Board of Equalization." The question presented was
whether the premises was a bona fide eating place. The court pointed out
that there were no legislative requirements for this determination and that
the Board has the sole power to set the determining standards. The State
Board had this legislative function in setting the standards but this func-
tion was not absolute and its discretion had to be exercised in accordance
with the law. The supreme court in Stoumen v. Reilly 2 stated that when
the State Board denies or revokes a license for good cause the decision
should not be arbitrary and should be based on sufficient evidence.
The decision of the State Board to issue or revoke the license was
final, except that the decision was subject to judicial review for excess
of jurisdiction, errors of law, abuse of discretion, and insufficiency of evi-
dence.' But, the State Board determined exclusively what was "good
cause," i.e. the public policy. Then review was on whether the facts of a
given case came within their determination of what was good cause.
Since the Department succeeds to the State Board's functions, the same
rules should apply to the jurisdiction of the Department-to determine
exclusively what is "good cause" and whether the facts come within this
cause.
Of course, judicial review of Department decisions would be the same
review given the State Board decisions as previously stated.
Functions of the Appeals Board
It appears, however, that the legislative intent was to change the scope
of review given the State Board decisions because the constitutional amend-
ment that established the Department simultaneously established an
Appeals Board with the power to review Department decisions.
This power to review is expressed as follows:14
9 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23051.
10 Irvine v. State Board of Equalization, 40 Cal. App. 2d 280, 104 P.2d 847 (1940).
129 Cal. 2d 125, 173 P.2d 545 (1956).
12 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951).
13 Covert v. State Board of Equalization, supra note 11.
14 CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22.
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Review by the board of a decision of the department shall be limited to the
questions whether the department has proceeded in the manner required
by law, whether the decision is supported by the findings, and whether the
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole rec-
ord.... The board shall enter an order either affirming or reversing the de-
cision of the department, the board may direct the reconsideration of the
matter in the light of its order and may direct the department to take such
further action as is specially enjoined upon it by law, but the order shall
not limit or control in any way the discretion vested by law in the depart-
ment. Orders of the board shall be subject to judicial review upon petition
of the director or any party aggrieved by such order. (Emphasis added.)
This general grant of power is particularized in the Business and Pro-
fessions Code. 5 There, the Appeals Board is given the express power to
set their own rules for appeals and other matters within their jurisdiction as
may be required.' 6 A subsequent section provides that the Appeals Board
make its determination from the record of the Department and upon briefs
which may be filed by the parties.1
7
The constitution seemingly provides that the Appeals Board in its
appellate proceedings is an administrative tribunal empowered to exercise
a discretion similar to that of the Department in its original consideration
of a particular case.
Consistent with this view is the fact that procedurally the Appeals
Board hearing is similar to a "trial de novo." At this hearing both parties
may question and re-examine all the witnesses, including the Department's
investigating officer.'" The Appeals Board apparently is to re-evaluate the
evidence.'9
The Appeals Board determines if there is substantial evidence in light
of the entire record to support the Department's decision. This was not a
review power that the superior court had in reviewing the old Board
decisions 20
The existence of some substantial discretion in the Appeals Board is
further evidenced by the fact that judicial review lies only from decisions
of the Appeals Board.2' And the Appeals Board acting in its quasi-judicial
capacity (distinguish legislative discretion) is the final "administrative"
body to pass on the facts.
However, the constitutional amendment states that the Appeals Board
order "shall not limit or control in any way the discretion vested by law in
the department." This seems inconsistent with the vast powers of review
15 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 23075-23086.
16 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23077.
17 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23083.
'8 Brief for Appellant, Appendix, p. 1. Munro v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board,
supra note 6.
19Ibid.
20 Covert v. State Board of Equalization, supra note 11.
21 CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23085.
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given the Appeals Board in the amendment read as a whole. This language
may be an unconscious carry-over from cases judicially reviewing State
Board decisions.22 In those early State Board cases, there was no judicial
re-evaluation of the evidence by the superior court.2s
The Appeals Board does apparently re-evaluate the evidence upon
which the Department's decision is based.' Does this mean that the
Appeals Board is empowered to re-evaluate the public policy indicated by
the Department's decision? And, since the Appeals Board's decision is
itself subject to review by the superior court in a mandate proceeding, the
further question arises: Whose discretion (i.e. the Department's or the
Appeals Board's) is under attack in the superior court proceeding?
If it should be decided that the Appeals Board has no "discretion" in
its review, then what valuable function is there for the Appeals Board to
perform?
Munro Case, Third District
In Munro v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board5 the Depart-
ment denied a license on the grounds, alleged in a protest, that the area was
residential and the parking facilities were not adequate.
The Appeals Board reversed. They found there were adequate parking
facilities, that the area was only semi-residential, and that the issuance
of the license would not be contrary to public morals. (In effect then the
Appeals Board made a quasi-legislative determination regarding the policy
of issuing a license in this case.) The Department filed and got a writ of
mandamus in the superior court directing the Appeals Board to reverse its
decision. Thereafter, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, first
reversed the superior court,26 but then on rehearing reinstated the decision
of the Department.
27
In first affirming the decision of the Appeals Board and the subsequent
reversal of its own decision, the district court stated that the decision of
the Department was under attack in a mandate proceeding (viz. not the
decision of the Appeals Board.) Judicial review is limited, it was declared,
to determining whether or not the decision of the Department is supported
by substantial evidence in the light of the entire record.28
Since the constitution provides that the Appeals Board reviews the
Department's decisions,' it seemingly follows that the superior court
should review the Appeals Board decision rather than the Department's
decision.
The District Court further stated :30
22 Irvine v. State Board of Equalization, supra note 10.
23 Ibid.
24 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23091.
25 Munro v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, supra note 6.
26 Munro v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 325 P.2d 533 (Cal. 1958).
2 7 Munro v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, supra note 6.
2 8 Id. at ......... 329 P.2d at 760.
2 CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22.30 Munro v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 329 P.2d 758, 760 (Cal. 1958).
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The rule of law applicable to the review of the decisions of the Department
of Alcoholic Beverage Control is stated in Brice v. Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control ... as follows: 31
"* * * That agency is a constitutional agency that has succeeded to some
of the powers of the State Board of Equalization in alcoholic beverage con-
trol matters. Being an agency upon which the constitution has conferred
limited judicial powers, its decisions on factual matters must be affirmed
if there is substantial evidence to support them.. , ." Thus, the Appeals
Board was simply called upon to determine whether the findings of the
department were supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole
record. It was not permitted to exercise an independent judgment on the
facts as contended for by appellant. (Emphasis added.)
If the district court was attempting to distinguish between factual mat-
ters and findings then, of the two concepts, good cause is more in the nature
of a finding. That is, "good cause" is not a "factual matter." One may say
good cause is either present in a given situation or not, but it is a judgment
from the facts and it is not itself an event.
Munro Case, Second District
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, disagreeing with the
Third District, recognized this line of reasoning in a similar situation.
In Munro v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals
Board2 the Department denied the transfer of a liquor license. The
Appeals Board reversed the decision of the Department by concluding
that the failure to mention an arrest in another state, when filing for a
license transfer, does not constitute "good cause" for denial of a transfer
of a license under section 22, article XX of the constitution. Such a decision
is clearly an exercise of a quasi-legislative power.
Upon appeal, the superior court reviewed the Department's decision
and found the Appeals Board decision to be arbitrary and a substitution
of its discretion for that of the Department.
In reversing this mandate order of the superior court, the district
court said: 3
The question here presented is not whether the decision of the department
is supported by the findings or whether the findings of the department are
supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record. It is the
function of the appeals board, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, to deter-
mine those questions. The appeals board reviews the decision of the depart-
ment; the court in a mandate proceeding reviews the order of the appeals
board. The question before the superior court was whether the appeals
board abused its discretion in reversing the decision of the department ....
(Emphasis added.)
31 Brice v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 153 Cal. App. 2d 315, 320, 314 P.2d
807, 810 (1957).
'32 Munro v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, supra note'7.
83 Id. at 647.
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This opinion clearly stated that the Appeals Board had some discretion,
and that the superior court, in a mandate proceeding, or the district court,
on appeal therefrom, is without authority to reweigh the evidence.34 And,
the opinion apparently recognized that the Appeals Board may reweigh the
evidence and use its discretionary power to decide the matter in the light
of the entire record. That is, the Appeals Board is to exercise its own dis-
cretion in determining what is "good cause" for the denial of a specific
license. If such is the case, the Appeals Board is obviously not limited to
the customary scope of appellate review.
The Supreme Court Answer to the Conflict
The supreme court granted hearings in both Munro cases.3 1 In each
of them the decisions of the respective superior courts were reinstated.
This would indicate that the superior court is to review the Department's
decisions, ignoring any exercise of discretion in the Appeals Board.
Taken on its face this reduces the hearing before the Appeals Board
to an administrative detour or blind alley that must be pursued in the
process exhausting administrative remedies. Under this view the hearing
becomes a numb proceeding with form and no substance; it would only
prolong the judicial process and the Appeals Board would have no pur-
pose except to act as a pre-trial hearing for the appellate department of
the superior court.
The supreme court, aware of this criticism, stated:"6
We therefore conclude that the judicial review here was properly directed at
the decision of the Appeals Board reversing the decision of the Depart-
ment. In this connection, however, it would appear obvious that any judi-
cial determination of whether the Appeals Board had exceeded its "limited"
powers would incidentally require a review of the decision of the Depart-
ment and of the record upon which the Department's decision had been
based. (Emphasis added.)
The connection between the two administrative courts seems to be
more than "incidental." The writer believes that the supreme court has
done no more than adopt the decision of the third district Munro case
(viz. recognizing no discretion in the Appeals Board).
As the supreme court sees it, the function of the Appeals Board in
deciding whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the
light of the whole record, is limited to an application of the substantial
evidence rule.37
In view of our conclusion that the 1954 amendment gave the Appeals Board
no greater powers than those previously exercised by the courts, it follows
34 5501 Hollywood, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 155 Cal. App. 2d
748, 318 P.2d 820 (1957).
85 Martin v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, supra note 6; Martin v. Alcoholic
Beverage Control Appeals Board, supra note 7.
36 Martin v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 52 Cal. 2d ........ , ....... 340 P.2d 1,
5 (1959).37 d. at ......... 340 P.2d at 7.
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that the same rule is applicable to the review of the Department's decision
by the Appeals Board. (Emphasis added.)
So that there could be no doubt regarding the existence of any faint
trace of discretion in the Appeals Board, the supreme court further
stated: 3
Even if it be conceded that reasonable minds might differ as to whether
granting would or would not be contrary to public welfare, such concession
merely shows that the determination of the question falls within the broad
area of discretion which the Department was empowered to exercise. (Em-
phasis added.)
In the hearing on the Second District case the court was consistent in
this view:3
9
It follows that if the Department makes a finding that the granting of the
application "would be contrary to public welfare," and there is substantial
evidence to show "good cause" for such determination, then the finding of
the Department must be sustained. (Emphasis added.)
Proposed Functions for the Appeals Board or Any
Other Administrative Appellate Review Body
The supreme court's decision makes the function of the Appeals Board
a mere duplication of the superior court hearing.4" On the other hand, if
the proposal of the Second District Munro case was strictly followed,
review by the Appeals Board would be a duplication of the Department's
hearing.4 Since neither of these extremes leaves the Appeals Board any
useful administrative function, its review power must be found somewhere
between that of the Department and the superior court.
The purpose of the Appeals Board is not questioned by anyone. It was
established to prevent the Department from acting arbitrarily in con-
trolling the sale of beverages. This purpose cannot be accomplished if
the Appeals Board must apply the "substantial evidence rule." "Good
cause" is a legislative or policy consideration. Some facts can always be
found to support even the remotest direction of policy. Operating under the
"substantial evidence" rule the Appeals Board would have to affirm the
Department's decision if there were any evidence in the report that could
sustain this policy decision. This test then leaves the Appeals Board help-
less and unable to carry out its intended purpose.
The test utilized by the United States Supreme Court in testing the
constitutionality of a state legislative act, to wit; "the rational legislator
as Id. at ...... ,340 P.2d at 7.
39 Martin v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 52 Cal. 2d ........ ........ 341 P.2d
291,294 (1959).
40The court justifies the duplication by saying that it gives applicants another review,
therefore many are satisfied and do not resort to the over crowded judicial courts. Martin v.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 52 Cal. 2d ....... 340 P.2d 1 (1959).
4 1 The court says it is following a strict interpretation of the constitutional amendment.
Munro v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, supra note 7.
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test" is similarly inadequate." Applying this test the Appeals Board could
rarely reverse a Department decision because a rational Department
could reasonably find some danger to the public morals in any situation
where alcoholic beverages are sold to the public. Therefore, if the Appeals
Board is to have any substantive purpose, a standard is needed whereby one
legislative body reviews the legislative acts of another legislative body-
not a strict judicial review.
To understand better the writer's proposal consider these two basic
premises:
(1.) The function of the trier of the facts is to determine which facts
are material and relevant.
(2.) The final legislative body produces the finished legislative product.
The Department is the administrative trial court sitting without a
jury empowered with discretion to determine the facts, then in light of
these facts render their decision regarding the policy involved in the par-
ticular case. The second step is the first legislative decision.
Then if the applicant appeals the decision of the Department, the
Appeals Board (the higher quasi-legislative body) must make the final
determination of the public policy involved regarding the continuance or
issuance of this particular license.
The Department's decision should raise a presumption that good cause
for the denial is established and the denial warranted. This would place
the entire burden on the applicant to show that the decision of the Depart-
ment was arbitrary and there would be no public detriment if the license
were continued or issued. But the higher quasi-legislative body (viz. the
Appeals Board) must have the final word on the legislative determination.
Of course the courts are ill prepared to formulate legislative standards,
for this, under our doctrine of separation of powers, has traditionally been
left to the legislature. But since the court must interpret the functions of
the Department and the Appeals Board from the constitutional amendment,
it is unfortunate that the supreme court did not recognize the type of func-
tion the Appeals Board should perform. If it had been recognized that this
final legislative determination should be made by the Appeals Board, the
courts could have handled the situation without the need of additional
legislation. They could have adopted the view of the Second District
Munro case, and in the tradition of Anglo-American Law, let the Appeals
Board determine each new situation--case by case. As things now stand,
only legislative amendment can provide any real substance into the function
of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board.
42 The test is whether a rational legislator could reasonably find that the statute will accom-
plish a proper state control. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941).
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